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Introduction
Much has been written on the causes of the Asian crisis and whole rivers of ink have also
been spilled on its aftermath. Lively discussions have been taking place on the pros and cons
of the IMF packages imposed on, in particular, Korea, Indonesia and Thailand. To its credit,
the IMF does not shy away from such discussions and they freely admit not to have foreseen
the severity of the crisis.’ They have responded to the substantial decline in GDP in these
countries by allowing more expansionary monetary and fiscal policies and they cannot be
accused of dogmatism. They even more or less openly admitted that not only they had been
taken by surprise but that they also had been a little baffled by the nature of the crisis, differ-
ing as it did from most other crises where their help was invoked.’ Whilst the course of events
in the countries implementing IMF-supported programmes is extensively analysed, however,
scant attention is given to other countries that also suffered from the Asian crisis. Potential
alternatives to the IMP way of handling the crisis are thus in danger of being neglected. We
feel that, in particular, the imposition of capital controls as a crisis measure should not be
dismissed out of hand. There is, therefore, every reason to compare the experience of Korea
and Thailand with that of Malaysia (no attention will be paid to Indonesia, because of the po-
litical situation, which gave the economic crisis a particular, and nasty, twist).
We do not go into the causes of the crisis, but we recognise  that poor regulation and super-
vision of the banking system have played a mayor role in deepening the crisis and that tying
one’s currency to the dollar at a time the dollar rises vis-a-vis the yen (from a low of 80 yen
in the dollar in 1995 to 147 in June 1998’) does little to prevent the current account of the
balance of payments deteriorating and making investors nervous. Still, the current account
deficit was already declining in Malaysia before the crisis broke out and at least in the case of
Malaysia can hardly be seen as a cause of the trouble (see Table 1).
Our analysis starts with the exposition of a standard dependent-economy model that, though
simple, can accommodate the salient features of the Asian crisis insofar they are related with
the exchange rate. On the basis of this model, we discuss the various ways to handle the crisis.
Finally, we go into more detail and confront Malaysia’s response to the crisis with the IMF
approach followed by Thailand and Korea.
2Current-Account Deficit as a Percentage of GDP
Korea Malaysia
Average 1990-‘95 - 1.2 - 6.2
1996 -47 . -49 .
1997 -18
13;  .
- 4 2
llil .1998 (expected)
1999 (forecast) 87  . 9 2  .
Thailand
- 6.6
-79 .
- 2 0
11-4  .
84  .
Table 1. Current Account Deficits in Korea, Malaysia and
Thailand.
Source: Economic and Financial Situation in Asia: Latest De-
velopments, IMF 16.1.1999 (available on the IMF website,
http://www.imf.org)..
A dependent-economv framework for analysing  the Asian crisis
Figure 1.  The dependent-economy model with fixed exchange rates.
N = line or curve depicting equilibrium conditions for the market for tradeables,
T = line or curve depicting equilibrium conditions for the market for nontradeables,
CA = balance on the current account of the balance of payments,
3MS = nominal money supply, Pt = price of tradeables, q = ratio of price of nontradeables to
price of tradeables.
Theoretical models can, of course, not beenseen  as truthful depictions of reality. They rather
are constructs that enable us to get a mental grip on the world around us. As McCloskey
wrote, “We humans must deal in fictions of our own making. Whether or not they correspond to
God’s Own Universe is something we cannot know’? We do not maintain, therefore, that the
neoclassical dependent-economy model is necessarily the best model to analyse the Asian crisis,
but we feel that some important aspects of that crisis can usefully be studied within that frame-
work. This modest claim implies that the model should not be applied mechanically. We are
fully aware, for instance, that continuous full-employment, an assumption in our model, cannot
be taken for granted.
The dependent-economy model is neoclassical in the sense that the price mechanism sees to it
that full employment is maintained or, after a shock, quickly restored. In the basic version of the
model there are two goods, tradeables and nontradeables? The price mechanism ensures constant
full-employment equilibrium in the nontradeables sector. In the tradeables sector there may be
excess supply or excess demand, i.e., a surplus or a deficit on the current account of the balance
of payments (we equate the current account with the trade account). Capital flows plus changes
in foreign exchange reserves can accommodate such imbalances. Only in a free-floating system
without capital flows (and, by definition, without interventions by the central bank) is the current
account permanently in equilibrium and the excess supply or demand in the market for trade-
ables consequently always zero. Demand and supply for tradeables on the world market are fully
price-elastic and the demand and supply of loanable  funds are fully interest-elastic. In other
words, the country faces given world prices of tradeables and a given international interest rate,
which explains the dependent-economy moniker.
Figure 1 depicts the equilibrium conditions for the market for tradeables and the market for
nontradeables. The market for nontradeables is always in equilibrium, the economy therefore is
permanently in a point on the N curve. The distribution of production between tradeables and
nontradeables is a function, and only a function, of the relative price q of the nontradeables. An
increase in q makes it attractive for producers to shift factors of production from the tradeables
industry to the nontradeables industry. In order to maintain equilibrium, demand for nontrade-
ables has to increase in step. In the model, demand is dependent on q again and on (financial)
wealth, represented by real cash balances (found by deflating the nominal money supply by the
price of tradeables rather than the general price level, this is more convenient for studying the
effects of current account imbalances and exchange rate changes). N consequently has a posi-
tive slope in the Ms/Pt,  q plane. For the T line or curve a similar reasoning applies. An increase
in the relative price of tradeables, i.e., a fall in q, makes producers shift resources from nontrade-
ables to tradeables. Equilibrium requires, again, an increase in wealth. The T line or curve thus
slopes downward. Given that the economy is on N all the time, it follows that the current account
of the balance of payments is in equilibrium at the point of intersection of N and T. To the right
of that point the value q is above the value that would bring equilibrium in the tradeables market;
i.e., the relative price of tradeables is below its equilibrium value. There will be excess demand
for tradeables, i.e., a deficit on the current account of the balance of payments
to the left of the point of intersection there is a surplus on the current account.
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At any point on N
Unemployment and sticky prices could be built in. In any point to the left of N wealth, and con-
sequently aggregate spending, is too low for equilibrium in the tradeables market. A shock that
reduces domestic spending thus may not make the system slide downward along the N curve,
but, at least initially, shift to the left from the N curve.
The Asian crisis and the wavs to handle it
The economies hit by the Asian crisis were characterised by a sudden drying up of net capital
inflows after a protracted period of net capital imports and current account deficits. Exchange
rates were perhaps not fully pegged to the dollar but yet kept more or less stable. Such a situation
corresponds to point A in Figure 1. If now net capital imports suddenly dry up, the economy has
to move to the intersection of N and T in order to prevent unemployment. III the case of net
capital outflows it would even have to move further to the left. In any case, a downward move-
ment along the N curve is implied. Under a fixed peg, this would require a fall in nominal prices
on the N market. To some extent that could happen without too much disruption to the economy:
current account deficits are typical for a situation where domestic spending exceeds domestic
income. There is increased aggregate demand (with respect to the situation with current account
equilibrium), which leads to net imports in the tradeables sector and to higher prices in the non-
tradeables sector. With net capital imports and consequently aggregate spending falling, nominal
prices in at least some parts of the nontradeable sector can be expected to give way reasonably
quickly, in particular real estate prices. But a fall in prices of other nontradeables, first of all
services, would be conditional on a fall in nominal wages, which is harder to realise. Given that
prices and wages are not as flexible as in the ideal neoclassical world which underlies the model,
a protracted period of relatively high unemployment can only be prevented if the required rela-
tive price adjustment is brought about by a devaluation of the domestic currency. Even then, a
shift of resources from the production of nontradeables to the production of tradeables can be a
painful process with serious transitional unemployment.
A shift to the left along N goes hand in hand with a fall in real balances as capital inflows stop
and the current account of the balance of payments is still in deficit. Monetary and fiscal policies
will have to be restrictive in order not to stimulate spending and in that way contribute to a fur-
ther depletion of the foreign exchange reserves. But this is not the whole story. At any given
combination of q and real wealth the propensity to spend is likely to fall. For one thing, business
firms get caught between falling sales and rising interest rates and if the domestic currency de-
valuates while they have large uncovered foreign currency denominated debts it may even be
difficult to avoid bankruptcy. This would destroy capital and reduce real wealth. The financial
sector is also likely to be severely hit, both because of such foreign debts on the credit side of
their balance sheet and because of a sudden rise in bad debts on the debit side. Bank credit will
be harder to get. All this will contribute to a fall in domestic spending. But that means that the
various curves in Figure 1 are likely to shift. A fall in the propensity to spend implies that at any
5value of q a higher value of real balances is required to make demand match supply. Both N and
T (and consequently CA) will shift to the right. This means that monetary policy, and fiscal pol-
icy for that matter (which is one determinant of the economy-wide propensity to spend), should
be less restrictive than might be deemed necessary at first sight.
The existence of foreign currency denominated debt is a complicating factor that compounds the
disruptive effects of a devaluation. Instead of sitting back and letting things run their course, the
authorities could therefore try to stem the downward slide of their currency. One way, essentially
the course advocated by the IMP,  would be to try to lure back investors, among other things by
keeping interest rates high, and another potential way would be to stop or reduce capital outflows
by introducing capital restrictions. There thus seem to be (at least) three ways open to the
authorities to deal with an Asian crisis type of situation:
- laissez-faire, with possibly a precipitous fall in the external value of the domestic currency,
widespread business failures and serious devaluation-induced inflation;
- the &!F  way, with restoring shattered investor confidence the immediate priority;6
- imposing (temporary) capital controls, as Malaysia’s Prime Minister, Dr Mahathir, did in Octo-
ber, 1998.
In all fairness it must be said that the IMP  does not stop at demanding restrictive monetary and
fiscal policies. A prominent feature of the IMP packages for the Asian countries was structural
reform in the financial and corporate sectors, aimed at restoring market confidence and at im-
proving growth prospects, in addition to financial support7 Of course, temporary capital controls
can go hand in hand with such measures. Indeed, Malaysia has taken steps to restructure the fi-
nancial sector, forced by circumstances.*
The question then arises which approach works better, the IMF approach or Malaysia’s. Put
differently: do (temporary) capital controls work and do the side effects not outweigh any bene-
fits from capital controls. We will look at the experience of Thailand and Korea on the one side
and Malaysia’s on the other. It should be said at the outset that no firm conclusions can be drawn
from such a comparison, mainly because capital controls were not introduced in Malaysia before
October, 1998, long after the currency, the ringgit, had come under attack.
Thailand and Korea vs Malaysia
The strategy chosen by the IMF in designing the policy packages for Thailand and Korea was to
try and break what they saw as a self-reinforcing cycle of capital outflows, exchange rate depre-
ciation, and financial sector weaknesses.’ This included, among other things, monetary tighten-
ing and a reduction of fiscal deficits or even the creation of a fiscal surplus. The fiscal measures
aimed on the one hand at facilitating external adjustment, i.e., at improving the current account
of the balance of payments, and on the other hand at accumulating funds to be used for financing
a cleaning-up of the financial sector. The IMP’s  immediate priority has been explicitly stated as
the restoration of shattered investor confidence.”
6It is our conviction that the priority given by the Fund to monetary and fiscal tightness was
mistaken. In terms of Figure 1, this policy drives the economy further to the left than is war-
ranted, aggravating the downturn (and unemployment, which is not in the diagram). The costs
are high, the benefits in terms of creating confidence in a country’s currency, which should
translate in a stabilisation, are negligible. In the case of Thailand, a stand-by arrangement was
approved by the Fund’s Executive Board on August 20, 1997, but that did not prevent the baht
slipping from 32.3 in the dollar to 56.1 in the dollar on January 12th,  1998 (see also Figure 3 and
Figure 4). On December 4, 1997, a stand-by arrangement for Korea was approved to the amount
of US$21  billion. The World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and individual countries be-
tween them promised another $37.4 billion. This did nothing to prevent the downward slide of
the won accelerating into a precipitous fall, from 1172.5 in the dollar on December 4th to 1962.5
on December 23th (see also Figure 2 and Figure 4). If economic agents expect a currency to de-
preciate in the short term, only draconic interest rate increases could stem a capital outflow (see
Box 1). Nonetheless, the IMF asserts that “In Korea, Thailand, and more recently Indonesia, the
tightening of monetary policies that occurred in the wake of the crises has achieved considerable
success in reestablishing financial stability, and the strengthening of exchange rates has allowed
interest rates to be lowered significantly”.” It is true that the exchange rates have recovered to
some extent, but it is doubtful whether that can be ascribed to high interest rates. One would
rather suspect that investors need time to adjust their portfolios after a reassessment of a coun-
try’s economic prospects and that this stock adjustment leads to exchange rate overshooting.i2
Indeed, the IMF itself notes that empirical studies do not find strong and unequivocal evidence
that tight monetary policies stave off speculative attacks.13
Even if the Fund confidently proclaims that the temporary monetary tightness has been suc-
cessful, they have been candid enough to admit that “A [. . .] difficult question is whether the
Thai and Korean programs’ successful stabilization caused monetary conditions to become too
tight, contributing excessively to the contraction in economic activity”.14  The same question
could be asked for Malaysia, which under Finance Minister Anwar Ibrahim followed similar
policies to Thailand and Korea, albeit without IMF support (other than moral suppor?).We
would be inclined to answer the question in the affirmative. In Table 1 we see that the swing in
the current account balance in the three countries between 1997 and 1998 was gigantic. This was
at the cost of, in all three cases, a fall in real total domestic demand by more than 20 percent?
Given that high interest rates are detrimental to business firms that, as seems predominantly to be
the case in Asia, are highly dependent on short-term debt17  and that steep declines in the external
value of the currency are harmful to firms, including banks, that have borrowed abroad without
foreign-exchange cover, the question naturally arises whether capital controls could help to
cushion the shock. It is well known that capital controls cause rent-seeking behaviour and will be
circumvented both legally and illegally. Indeed, it was the growing difficulty to control capital
flows that lay behind the decision to liberalise capital flows in Indonesia in 1970 and to fully
liberalise capital movements in Europe in the 1980s.” Still, if there is a crisis, one should take
recourse to emergency measures and not pretend that business is as usual. There is, to our view, a
case for imposing capital controls for a short period, say a couple of months to half a year, in
order to prevent overshooting of the exchange rate and to keep interest rates low at the same
time. As the panic ebbs away, the controls can be eased. People need time to devise ways to cir-
cumvent regulations and such regulations should be able to bite for a restricted number of
months.
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Figure 2. Malaysian and Korean exchange rates, 26 December 1996 to 4 March 1999. The
ringgit/dollar  rate is measured on the left-hand vertical axis, the won/dollar rate on the right-
hand one. Source: Datastream. Malaysian rates before August 11, 1997 from IMF
International Financial Statistics. Note that for Malaysia, 500000 etc. should read as 5.00000
etc .
One may ask whether the experience with the Malaysian controls, effective from October 1,
1998, offers any evidence as to the desirability of capital controls. In Figures 2, 3 and 4 we
see that between August 1997 and February 1998 the ringgit and the baht followed a
remarkably similar course, but since then the baht has been recovering more lost ground than
the ringgit. The won is a slightly different story. Its fall was more precipitous, but its recovery
from its nadir is more or less along the same line as the bath’s (see Figure 4). Whereas the
baht and the won more or less halved their depreciation, the ringgit was slipping away again.
Possibly investors became disheartened because of a combination of what they saw as lax
monetary policies and Dr Mahathir’s attack on speculators and the Western world in general
in a speech delivered at the joint IMP/World Bank Annual Meeting in Hong Kong in
September 1997l’; followed by the fall from grace on 2 September 1998 of Malaysia’s
Finance Minister Anwar  Ibrahim, who was highly respected in financial circles around the
world. It was then that Malaysia decided to introduce capital controls, effective as from
October 1. In explaining this decision, Malaysia’s Second Finance Minister referred to the
distress caused by the combination of high interest rates and tight fiscal policies.20  To all
evidence, the controls succeeded in bringing the depreciation to a halt. Still, the ringgit has
lost more terrain relative to its level in mid-1997, when things started moving the wrong way
in Asia, than the won and the baht (see Figures 2, 3 and 4). This may, however, not be wholly
the result of scared investors staying away, but rather be a consequence of the fact that
foreigners are welcome in Thailand and Korea to take over ailing businesses, whereas
Malaysia is interested in foreign
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Figure 3. Malaysian and Thai exchange rates, 26 December 1996 to 4 March 1999. The
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Figure 4. Thai and Korean exchange rates, 27 December 1996 to 4 March 1999. The
baht/dollar  rate is measured on the right-hand vertical axis, the won/dollar rate on the left-
hand one. Source: Datastream.
direct investment but not in takeovers. Cross-border mergers and acquisitions in Korea
increased from $1.4 billion in 1997 to $6.3 billion in 1998 and total foreign direct investment
rose from $2.8 billion to $5.1 billion. Thailand saw a similar rise, from $3.7 billion to $7.0
billion, whereas net foreign direct investment in Malaysia fell from $5.1 billion to $3.6
billion.21  The severe drought that hit Malaysia in 1998 may also have taken its toll. Anyhow,
the ringgit has been stabilised and pressures seem to have abated and, as in Thailand and
Korea, interest rates have fallen to pre-crisis levels.
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If participants in foreign-exchange markets have a firm expectation of an
imminent rise or fall in the exchange rate, short-term interest rates have to
rise to extremely high levels indeed if they are to stem speculation. We start
from uncovered interest parity:
(1 + i) = (1 + if).&+r/q
Let market participants expect a rise in the price of foreign exchange of 10
per cent in a week’s time. E,et+l/et  then has the value 1.1. If the foreign short-
term interest rate is, say, 8 per cent per annum, the UP  formula for a one-
week horizon becomes
(1  + i)1’52  = (1.08)1’52.(1.1)
Taking logs, we find
l/52  ln(1  + i) = l/52  ln(1.08) + ln(l.1)
which yields
1 + i = 153.406
so that
i = 152.406 = 15,240.6  per cent on an annual basis.
Assuming 260 workdays a year and composite interest, this works out at
1.95 per cent interest per day.
One case where it was decided to pull all stops to thwart speculation was
Ireland in September 1992. Interest rates were upped to 25,000 percent, or
2.148 per cent per day, and this proved sufficient to stop speculation against
the punt at that time .
Box I. Interest rates and speculation.
i = domestic interest rate, if = foreign interest rate, E = expectations operator, e = exchange rate
(in terms of the number of domestic currency units per unit of foreign exchange), subscripts de-
note points in time.
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Conclusions
Capital controls, to be imposed for a period of a few months to half a year, should be considered
as a serious alternative to the IMF knee-jerk reaction of tight monetary and fiscal policies.22  It
could be an effective means to prevent the overshooting to which exchange rates apparently are
prone and might alleviate the need for a drastic reduction in domestic spending. It is a pity that
Malaysia resorted to capital controls at such a late stage, when the harm had already been done.
Had Dr Mahathir followed his natural inclinations immediately after the crisis broke out, and had
he not ftightened  speculators away by his anti-western rhetoric, we most likely would have had
an ideal experiment enabling us to evaluate two competing approaches to facing a foreign-
exchange crisis. So far, we can only say that the jury is still out. But even if capital controls
should not prove superior to the IMF approach, it might at least turn out that there are more ways
to handle a crisis than only the Washington, D.C. approved one.
All this does not alter the fact that it is better to prevent a crisis than to solve one. Excessive
capital inflows, that stimulate spending and lead to import surpluses and to relatively high prices
of nontradeables (a situation represented by point A in Figure I), should preferably be prevented.
Imposing minimum capital ratios vis-a-vis foreign debts on firms, and on financial institutions in
the first place, might help. Business firms would also become less vulnerable to hitches in the
flow of short-term credit if they became less dependent on such credit. In South-East Asia, sav-
ings seem to flow primarily to the banks and business firms are to a great deal dependent on the
banks for their financing. Governments could contribute to improved financial stability by taking
steps to develop their capital markets. One such step could be the introduction of funded pension
systems and allowing pension funds to invest in private sector bonds and shares, following the
example set by Chile.23 That might make firms less dependent on short-term debt and thus less
vulnerable to a liquidity squeeze. Another way is to grant borrowers the right to demand debt
roll-overs from banks at the borrower’s discretion, but at a penalty rate, as proposed by Buiter
and Sibert24  or some scheme to make banks share more of the risks of international lending. As it
is now, the binary nature of capital flows, i.e., their on or off character, imposes unwarranted
hardships on the countries hit by a sudden capital outflow.
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